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Abstract 
The explosion of the Information Age has brought with it unforseen challenges to society. 
One such challenge is the establishment of what should and should not remain private and how 
to enforce these rights. This paper examines privacy issues in relation to the Internet in three 
specific areas: anonymous remailers, "cookies," and encryption software. Standards in place 
today are examined, and steps towards protection of privacy are suggested for the future. 
-Stylistic Note: 
Unfortunately, there is no one official standard for MLA-style citation of all electronic 
information. For the purposes of this paper, I have selected to use MLA-Style Citations of 
Electronic Sources as formulated by Janice R. Walker ofthe University of South Florida. Since 
Walker's guide does not mention a proper method for in-text citation of material, I have been 
forced devise my own method. When citing information obtained from the World Wide Web, 
the author's name will be given without a page number. This is necessary because web pages are 
not broken down into pages when viewed in browsers. Further, not all browsers have a standard 
method for printing; in other words, what may be page three when printed from Netscape 
Navigator may be page four when printed from Microsoft Internet Explorer. 
If the reader wishes to verify the accuracy of a quotation, he or she is invited to visit the 
web site listed in the "Works Cited" portion of this paper. Since some of these web sites can be 
quite large, I would suggest that the reader use the "Find" feature in their browser to locate the 
phrase in question. 
Ethics and the Internet: An Analysis of On-line Privacy 
I. Introduction and General Outline 
The Internet is fundamentally changing the way the wo~ld operates. It has forced 
societies around the globe to re-evaluate traditions and features of society which have gone 
unquestioned for decades. The Internet has modernized the way human beings communicate and 
has completely altered perceptions of distance; communications that once took days to deliver 
now take only fractions of a second to reach their destinations. It is also true that the Internet has 
led to an explosion of information. This is almost a unanimously celebrated consequence of this 
newest global communications network; however, it is not without its downside as well. Some 
fear that the new medium will almost certainly spell an end to privacy as it is now known or 
enjoyed. It is the position of this thesis that in order to protect privacy in this new medium, there 
must be moderation; neither absolute privacy nor absolute disclosure will provide a reasonable 
answer to the problem at hand. 
This discussion will explore issues surrounding privacy on the Internet. It will seek to 
answer questions such as, "Is there really any such thing as privacy on the Internet? How much 
privacy should there be, if any even exists? Who should set the standards for on-line privacy?" 
To begin, definitions of key terminology will be established. A philosophical notion of privacy, 
in addition to a legal definition ofthe right of privacy, will be given. Following this will be a 
brief discussion of what the Internet is. Specific aspects of the Internet will be elucidated as they 
become relevant to the discussion at hand. 
Following this, privacy will be examined with respect to the following three areas of the 
Internet: the right to anonymity on the Internet, "cookies," and·encryption. After examining 
__ these issues, the discussion will tum to the question of what should be done regarding on-line 
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privacy, and will then look at one event involving the Social Security Administration which 
spawned a great amount of concern about what personal information can be obtained via the 
Internet by almost anyone. The discussion shall tum to what measures are in place now to 
protect the privacy of individuals in cyberspace. Finally, an answer will be posed to the question 
of whose responsibility it is to safeguard privacy in a digital world and why a moderate approach 
to privacy issues is the most preferable solution to the problems at hand. 
II. Definitions of Key Terminology 
Before any serious discussion of privacy and the Internet can take place, key terms must 
be defined in order to establish a common understanding of the topics at hand. In The Oxford 
Dictionary of Philosophy Blackburn defines privacy as "that which it is no business of the 
public, and particularly the public institution of law" (303). Also, Blackburn notes that "private 
information about a person would be that to which there can be no right of public access" (303). 
He further states that any attempt to assign an objective opinion on an abstract notion is often 
heavily criticized by certain groups. As an example of this, Blackburn recalls that feminists 
often question any distinction between the terms "public" and "private," claiming that notions of 
privacy only serve to hide "unrestricted male domination of children and women" (303). 
However, for the purposes of this discussion, Blackburn's definitions of private conduct and 
information will be accepted as a legitimate explanation. For the purposes of this paper, one 
must examine a legal definition of the privacy and one's right to it, as well. Black's Law 
Dictionary defines the right of privacy as a "generic term encompassing various rights 
recognized to be inherent to a concept of ordered liberty, and such right prevents governmental 
interference in intimate personal relationships or activities, freedoms of individual to make 
--
-
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fundamental choices involving himself, his family, and his relationship with others" (Black 
1195). This definition is highly similar to the philosophical definition given earlier, and is 
equally vague. However, Black's Law Dictionary expounds on this definition somewhat by 
noting the four varieties of tort actions included under the more general "invasion of privacy." 
The first is appropriation, which refers to assuming the identity of another individual for any 
advantage or gain of he or she who assumes the persona (Black 1195). The second is intrusion, 
which "consist[ s] of intrusion upon the plaintiff s solitude or seclusion, as by invading his home, 
eavesdropping, as well as persistent and unwanted telephone calls" (Black 1195). The third 
variety is public disclosure of private facts, the meaning of which is understood almost prima 
facie. The most important item to note about this type of invasion of privacy is that all disclosed 
facts are true; this is not to be confused with an instance of an individual creating and 
subsequently circulation falsehoods about another person. That type of invasion of privacy is the 
fourth classification, known asfalse light in the public eye, "[consists] of publicity which places 
the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye" (Black 1195). Of primary concern to this 
discussion will be intrusion and public disclosure of private facts. 
In order to establish a common framework for discussion of the issues at hand, it is 
necessary to formulate a definition for the Internet. Bill Gates gives this definition of the Internet 
in his book, The Road Ahead: "[the Internet] is a group of computers joined [which are] 
exchanging information using current technology" (3-4). This group of computers is joined or 
connected primarily by wires. These range from ordinary telephone cable, which carries 
information at a rate of28,800 bits (or more commonly "baud") per second (bps) to 33,600 bps 
to special cable known as ISDN, which can support up to 128,000 bps. Although there are 
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connections which provide even greater speed, most of these are reserved for use by large 
corporations and Internet Service Providers because of the prohibitive cost associated with them. 
Only a small percentage of the information which traverses the Internet does so by means of 
satellite technology; for the most part, data transmission is done by wire. The Internet is truly a 
global phenomena. According to PBS Online, "the World Wide Web sports a growth rate of 
341,634% in service traffic in its third year, 1993." This means it spans a great number of 
countries, which creates problems when dealing with issues of regulating the Internet, as will be 
discussed later in this paper. 
III. Privacy and the Internet 
Before discussing electronic privacy, Cavazos and Morin discuss the views most 
Americans hold regarding privacy in general. They remark that privacy is "considered [to be] a 
core value by most citizens ... [although] it is not explicitly delineated as a protected right by 
the U.S. Constitution" (13). The hypothesis is then formulated that "the reason privacy is not 
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution is that at the time of its drafting there were only a small 
number of ways that one's privacy could be invaded" (Cavazos and Morin 13). However, in the 
last two centuries in particular there has been a veritable explosion of ways which one can invade 
the privacy of another. Cavazos and Morin comment that "the framers of the Constitution could 
not address ... the myriad of privacy concerns that developed as new technologies were 
introduced into society" (13). This has necessitated the formulation of laws which are designed 
to prevent such invasions. 
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One proposal to curb the number of invasions of privacy performed via electronic means l 
is the end of anonymity on the Internet. Consider the case of "anonymous remailers." Because 
e-mail can easily be traced back to its origin, anonymous remailers were introduced to the on-line 
world. These anonymous remailers are "programs that receive mail, strip it of any traceable 
identifying information, and forward it to the addressee" (Cavazos and Morin, 16). Further, there 
are also "anonymous servers," which are systems that allow the individuals or groups of 
individuals to communicate with complete anonymity (Cavazos and Morin, 16). 
Anonymous e-mail can be used for many purposes which would benefit society. 
Individuals could safely register legitimate complaints without having to worry that their identity 
will be made known. People could safely report criminal activity without having to worry about 
their safety - for example, a person could report that his neighbor was selling drugs in the 
apartment complex with much more security than having to place a traceable telephone call. 
Individuals could even share stories in public forums that they might not otherwise share; in 
other words, there could be a very large advice column, where instead of one person giving 
suggestions, thousands upon thousands could voice their recommendations. 
Unfortunately, anonymity and e-mail can be used for less than noble (and legal) purposes 
as well. Consider the case of certain news groups. A news group is similar to a large bulletin 
board, and any messages posted upon it are relevant to one particular topic. For example, 
suppose that there are a large number of students at State University who are interested in John 
lBy "electronic invasions of privacy," Cavazos and Morin are referring to "electronic eavesdropping 
devices, video and sound recording instruments, and large databases of personal information" (13). Although they 
do not implicitly state that interception of e-mail is a form of electronic eavesdropping, most would concur that it is. 
,-
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Grisham novels. They wish to organize a meeting so that they may discuss their favorite author. 
However, since the group is so large, there is no way that the students can all meet at one time. 
One student proposes that they reserve a bulletin board in the Student Union for their exclusive 
use. Here students may post messages about The Partner, Grisham's latest, to share their 
thoughts on the matter. Each message has a subject line at the top so that someone may walk up 
to the board and read just one line to see whether or not they care to invest the time to read the 
entire message. If they do read it and wish to reply, they may do so. Now, another group of 
students, having seen the success of this idea, reserves their own bulletin board for messages 
regarding the TV series Star Trek: Deep Space Nine. 2 
Newsgroups operate in a similar fashion. There tens of thousands of news groups, each 
one organized by topic as in the preceding example. Internet users may choose to view 
news groups about topics which interest them, and they can then choose to participate in 
discussion through electronic messages which are "posted" to these electronic bulletin boards. 
Once a message has been posted, it is possible for anyone with access to that newsgroup to read 
it. As pointed out earlier, anonymous messaging can serve many useful purposes. Think for a 
moment of rape victims. These individuals understandably may not want to share the stories of 
their victimization with other people in a face-to-face situation. In this case, the Internet 
provides a forum, with the help of anonymous servers, where victims may discuss their situations 
2In fact, there is a newsgroup dedicated to this particular author's works: 
alt.books.john-grisham. There are also many news groups for discussion of Star Trek in its many 
incarnations; the most popular is probably rec.arts.startrek.current. 
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without the same level of awkwardness that might be present when physically surrounded by 
others. This forum may help many come to terms with devastating experiences. 
Unfortunately, as noted earlier, it can also be used for other purposes which do not share 
the same high goals. The following screen capture shows the results received when a search was 
performed for all news groups with the word "rape" in their title. The news group "talk.rape" is 
perhaps a news group dedicated to helping victims of that particular crime overcome their 
negative feelings. However, what positive thing can be said about the newsgroup entitled, 
"alt.binaries.pictures.erotica.rape"?3 Most likely, individuals who post pictures of rapes to this 
group will use anonymous servers in order to prevent apprehension by authorities. 
altrec.therapeutic 
altswp.socialistmark.curtis.guilty.of.child.rape 
talk.rape 
Figure 1 - Screen capture of a list of newsgroups containing the term "rape" in their titles. 
3 At no time were any of the newsgroups seen on this screen accessed by the author. 
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Coursey argues that this service should not be allowed. "Sure, on the Internet nobody 
knows you're a dog, but they also don't know you're a stalker, a child pornographer or a member 
of the Cali drug cartel," he writes. "I'd like that to change." Therefore, he proposes that "every 
account or username would have to be linked to a master account and a human being. Online 
services would be required to keep user E-mail logs and transcripts for at least thirty days, 
allowing for the resolution of disputes and criminal investigations". Coursey's idea is extreme; 
he readily admits this himself. Is this, however, a good idea? 
As it stands, just because a person uses anonymous e-mail does not mean that he or she 
will not be apprehended or reprimanded by the authorities. The government has already "used 
fire to fight fire." Government authorities will frequently use anonymous e-mail to allow them 
to go undercover on the Internet. Imagine a situation where someone is using anonymous servers 
to organize buyers for illegal substances. When the goods are shipped or delivered in person, the 
guilty party may be apprehended. In effect, it is no different from undercover officers soliciting 
prostitutes or drug dealers in order to apprehend them. Further, as noted earlier, anonymous 
servers can be used for perfectly legal and positive uses, as well. Therefore, some may feel that 
Coursey's suggestion ultimately goes too far and may ultimately do more harm than good. "If it 
isn't broken," the adage says, "then do not fix it." In this particular instance, the adage may 
apply. 
Following Coursey's idea would lead to a loss of privacy which can be very beneficial in 
many circumstances. Forcing individuals' identities to be linked to a central database by which 
their comments may be linked back to them could create a stifling atmosphere wherein people 
--
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may be too afraid to speak their minds. Imagine if Ann Landers either printed real names instead 
of pseudonyms or provided a means by which the identities of the persons writing letters to her 
could be obtained. Certainly this would decrease the volume of letters her column receives. 
Who would want to write about their new spouse's annoying family or co-workers bad personal 
hygiene? Similarly, this could be the case on the Internet. Granted, the cases in the previous 
example may seem trivial, but they could just as easily concern victims of fraud or personal 
tragedies whose comments could positively affect the lives of countless others. 
Yet another method to limit abuses by anonymous servers would be to make sure that 
those who operate them are subject to strict federal regulation. This might limit the number of 
servers available to users. If they are not very common, it is possible that their use might be 
limited (or the use of those few might increase dramatically, conversely). Finally, if users were 
forced to pay for an account, this too might limit the use of the services to those who only need 
to use the service for legitimate purposes. Of course, it might also compromise the privacy of the 
person using it - although complete privacy is never assured when using these services in the 
first place. Cavazos and Morin note that "their traffic might be monitored, or the individuals 
operating the service might keep system logs that compromise the confidential nature of the 
service" (16). Perhaps it might be possible to set up a system of anonymous payment in which 
the identity of an individual would be compromised only ifhe or she did not pay. Regardless, 
there are enough possibilities of monitoring these systems to prove that eradicating them would 
be a premature and unnecessary step. 
Yet another area of concern regarding privacy and the Internet are web browsers and 
"cookies." A web browser is a program such as Microsoft Internet Explorer or Netscape 
.-
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Navigator which allows a user to view World Wide Web documents. If viewing information on 
the Internet is truly like surfing, as the very popular analogy suggests, then the web browser is 
the board upon which you surf. Most people assume that browsing is a relatively secure 
operation; they mistakenly believe that the sites they visit cannot be tracked. This, however, is 
not the case - small pieces of data known as "cookies" ensure that someone somewhere will 
have the ability to determine whether or not an individual has visited their web site. 
Mayer-Schonberger explains the concept of the cookie by an example similar to the one 
which follows. Picture Joe Smith in front of his PC. He connects to his ISP4 and uses his web 
browser to access the MSNBC homepage. MSNBC is a news service which is ajoint venture 
between the Microsoft Network (an ISP such as America Online) and NBC. MSNBC presents 
current news and editorials on both a web page and a cable or satellite television station. 
However, unlike the MSNBC television station, their web page allows users to customize how 
the page will appear. For example, Joe Smith is a conservative political science professor. He 
can therefore customize the page such that it shows more news relating to state and federal 
government and fewer sports related stories. Further, he can even choose to read editorials from 
writers who are more conservative than liberal. However, there must be a way for the computer 
to remember this information so that even after Smith has logged out and back in, all of his 
personalized features will not be lost. This is where the cookie enters the picture. As Smith is 
4ISP stand for Internet Service Provider. These are businesses which allow other 
businesses, schools, and individuals to access the Internet with a PC and a modem. Probably the 
most well-known example of an ISP is America On-Line. Other national ISPs include Microsoft 
Network and Prodigy. Smaller, local ISPs available to residents of Delaware county include Net 
Direct, Iquest, and IndyNet. 
,-
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customizing his page for the very first time, the MSNBC computer creates a small packet of data 
which contains a list of features which he has personalized. The computer then sends this to 
Smith's computer, where it remains. However, the next time Smith logs back into MSNBC, the 
cookie is transmitted from Smith's computer to the MSNBC server. This entire process occurs 
without the knowledge or consent of the user. "This happens without any notification or user 
consent," writes Mayer-Schonberger. This in itself seems rather harmless; in this context, 
perhaps it is. 
However, Mayer-Schonberger continues: " ... a Web server (the computer to which the 
user connects to when viewing a web page - in the case of our previous example, the MSNBC 
web server) may set a cookie so that an unlimited number of other servers have access to the 
cookie information as well." Consider the impact of this; if a cookie is designed so that any web 
server can access it, what information is being given to companies or individuals around the 
globe? Suppose that you have accessed twenty-five pages in the last month which make use of 
cookies. Of those twenty-five, ten are written such that they are sent to every web server which 
utilize cookies. What personal information about the individual is being transmitted without 
consent, and who is receiving it? Further, for what purpose are those on the receiving end using 
the information? 
"While the U.S. and Europe are in general agreement on the principal importance and 
validity of privacy and the protection of one's personal information, the scope of privacy rights 
differs substantially between the U.S. and Europe," Mayer-Schonberger writes. He goes on to 
write that the United States tends to protect only certain forms of electronic privacy, "such as in 
.-
-
Janney 12 
the area of credit reporting or video cassette rental. European nations have openly embraced 
omnibus data protection acts covering each and every electronic processing of personal data." 
Clearly, this use of the cookie is an invasion of privacy by both a public disclosure of 
private fact, and a case can be made that privacy is invaded by intrusion as well. In the case of 
public disclosure of private facts, if you customize a page with information which potentially 
discloses your racial background, religious affiliation, or even sexual orientation in the form of a 
cookie which will be distributed to any number of individuals without your knowledge or 
consent, the loss of privacy is obvious. How, though, is it a case of intrusion? Recall that any 
intrusions into "[an individual's] solitude or seclusion, as by invading his home, eavesdropping, 
as well as persistent and unwanted telephone calls" (Black 1195). The point of interest here is 
eavesdropping - and in essence, is not the collection of facts one's private interests, pastimes, 
and background with neither the consent nor knowledge of the one studied eavesdropping? 
Undoubtedly, the answer is yes. However, an opponent of this position would be quick to point 
out that the individual whose preferences, etc., were being made known was in error in believing 
that their on-line activities were somehow private to begin with. Ignorance does not constitute an 
excuse, they might claim. 
Steps are already being taken to counter the problematic nature of cookies. Newer 
versions of browsers can be customized such that they display a warning message before a 
cookie is accepted. However, as Mayer-Schonberger points ou~, "such warnings do not contain 
the information required ... for the user to give her 'informed' consent." Consider, as an 
example, an actual warning this author received from his browser as he accessed a commercial 
web site. 
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Figure 2 - Screen capture o/Microsoft Internet Explorer 3.02's cookie warning. 
As the reader can plainly see, the warning is cryptic and impossible for the lay person 
(and even those who are not lay people, in many cases) to understand. Further, this warning says 
nothing of the information which will be divulged. Instead, it asserts that the contents of the 
cookie are "BHLBDFTZRAIWWIEZ." Further, take note of the expiration date field! There is 
nothing there, which means that perhaps this cookie will terminate as soon as the session ends, or 
perhaps it does not ever expire. Finally, note that if the user clicks the "No" button, the page 
may not display properly. This might convince the average computer user that perhaps they 
would be better off accepting the security risk which they do not understand so that the page will 
display as it should. It seems that perhaps this security feature is not so much for the user's 
peace of mind, but rather for the purpose of the browser manufacturer being able to tout their 
highly secure browser. 
Cookies are also used for advertising purposes, in which case unsuspecting users become 
demographic data for companies with a web presence. Often, Mayer-Schonberger points out, 
many commercial web sites are supported by advertising, which works in the following fashion. 
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Suppose a user visits the ACME company homepage. To help subsidize the cost of their page, 
ACME allows other companies to advertise on small segments of the ACME page. Now, further 
suppose that Yoyodine Industries wants to advertise on the ACME homepage. ACME sets up 
their web page so that each time the page is accessed, their web server contacts the Y oyodine 
web server and downloads the advertisement. 
Mayer-Schonberger writes, " ... as this transpires, something quite clandestine happens: 
the advertisement server sets a special cookie in the user's computer." Now suppose that 
Yoyodine advertises on over 1,000 different corporate web pages around the globe. If Joe Smith 
(from the earlier example) leaves the MSNBC homepage to view a list of ACME's products, and 
Yoyodine is advertising on the ACME page, then a cookie will be deposited into Smith's 
computer from the advertisement. If Smith visits a different web site upon which Y oyodine 
advertises, "the cookie data residing in the user's computer will be transmitted automatically to 
the advertisement server," Mayer-Schonberger notes. This data is then collected and used to 
create profiles of who the company's most likely customers would be. "The user has become the 
unpaid agent of the direct marketing agency, supplying it with all the personal information and 
preferences needed, but without ever knowing it," Mayer-Schonberger concludes. 
Netscape Communications, however, has this to say in response to the question, "Can 
cookies be used to gather sensitive information, such as a user's email address?" 
Cookies cannot be used to gather sensitive information such as the fields in a Netscape 
preference file. They can be used to store any information that the user volunteers, for 
example by filling out an HTML form. In this case, however, the same information can 
just as easily (and with potentially more objectionable privacy concerns) be stored on the 
--
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server by using a simple server-side application that stores user information in a database. 
Cookies are passive data structures that are delivered to the client, stored on the client's 
hard drive, and returned in certain situations to the same server that provided the 
information in the first place (Cookies and Privacy FAQ). 
The above is true of cookies which conform to the Netscape standard (Netscape Navigator has 
supported cookies since version 1.1). However, Mayer-Schonberger points out that the Netscape 
standards easily enables servers to overwrite those standards. "Though it is not illegal per se, the 
browser companies provide a structure that not only creates loopholes but makes compliance 
with specific requirements of data protection norms, like notification and consent, difficult to 
conceive and realize," Mayer-Schonberger says. 
This leads one to the conclusion that cookies do not allow for protection of private facts. 
Again, this could ultimately lead to claims that the browser manufacturers have allowed for 
public disclosure of private facts, and that more steps should have been taken to protect the 
privacy of the end-user. Obviously, one way to maneuver around the cookie problem would be 
to make it very easy for the user to manipulate them. Imagine if cookies were as easy to control 
and understand as the web browser itself was. Consider Figure 2. Would it be quite as 
objectionable if it told the user exactly what data was being transmitted in language simple 
enough for everyone to understand? For example, instead of saying "BHLBDFTZRAIWWlEZ," 
what if the warning screen said, "Information regarding the number of times you have visited this 
site as well as data regarding your preference for conservative editorials, the stock quotes you 
have chosen to see, and NBA scores you want reported is about to be sent to the MSNBC server. 
Do you want to send this information?" Further, the page should display the same regardless of 
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whether or not a cookie is sent. Cookies should not be allowed to be sent to any server other 
than that which created it. Ease of use, coupled with full disclosure ofthe cookie's contents, as 
well as information regarding the cookie's ultimate (and only) destination would prevent these 
files from potentially invading the privacy of the end user. 
Yet another area of concern for those wishing to protect the right to privacy in the on-line 
world is encryption software and the attitude of the federal government towards it. According to 
Bill Gates, mogul of the Microsoft empire, the traditional encrypting of data is a fairly simple 
process; deciphering that same data, on the other hand, can represent quite a challenge if the 
encryption has been done properly (109). Encryption uses prime numbers, which are numbers 
unable to be divided evenly by anything other than 1 and itself. For example, 7 and 13 are prime 
numbers, while the numbers 9 and 27 are not; the latter two numbers are both evenly divisible by 
three. Therefore, they cannot be prime. It is exceedingly simple to multiply the prime numbers 7 
and 13 and discover that the resulting number is 91. It is, however, more difficult to try to find 
out which two prime numbers were used to produce 91. Now, consider multiplying two prime 
numbers when each number contains over two hundred and fifty digits. Gates reports that" ... 
mathematicians today believe that a 250-digit-Iong product of two primes would take millions of 
years to factor [the process by which the two prime numbers were multiplied to end up with any 
resulting number x] with any foreseeable amount of computing power" (110). 
How does this figure into encryption? Once again, imagine Smith at his PC. He wishes 
to send encrypted data to Jones, a recipient in a different country. Presumably, the process of 
encrypting data or e-mail for the end user will be simplified to the point of clicking on a toolbar 
icon which resembles a padlock or a key. However, what goes on inside the computer when the 
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button is clicked is not so simplistic. "Each user's computer," Gates writes, " ... will use prime 
numbers to generate an enciphering key, which will be listed publicly, and a corresponding 
deciphering key, which only the user will know" (108). When Smith clicks on the toolbar icon 
which encrypts the contents of his message, the computer will look up the intended recipient's 
public enciphering key. This public enciphering key is then used to encrypt the message. Upon 
receipt of the encrypted message, Jones's computer utilizes its private deciphering key to decode 
the message so that it may be read. If Jones sends Smith a reply which he wishes to be 
encrypted, the process is reversed. Now Jones's computer will look up Smith's public 
enciphering key and use that key to encrypt his message. Smith's computer will then use its 
private key to decipher the message. Since both ofthese keys are created by utilizing remarkably 
large prime numbers, this system is remarkably secure - some even say perfectly secure. The 
WWW Security FA Q says this of encryption: "The message can only be decrypted by the owner 
of the secret private key, making it safe from interception. This system can also be used to create 
unforgeable digital signatures." 
Naturally, this system of encryption has both practical utility as well as less-than-noble 
uses. For example, encryption could allow doctors to securely discuss their patients in an effort 
to help diagnose or cure an illness with greater privacy (and speed) than ever before. Lawyers 
could use the system to consult with not only their clients, but also other attorneys on their 
particular case and similar cases, secure in the knowledge that the attorney-client privilege was in 
no danger of being violated. Government officials could discuss matters of national security 
without having to worry about covert surveillance. The possibility for encryption to do 
enormous amounts of good for society are endless. 
,-
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The detractors of encryption are quick to point out that it can also do enormous amounts 
of damage, as well. Child pornographers could exchange materials without concern of being 
apprehended by the authorities. Drug cartels and organized crime could engage in illegal doings 
without having to worry about getting caught. Naturally, this is not a desirable situation as far as 
most are concerned. 
Of course, this means that the federal government no longer has the ability to monitor 
communications as it once did. Naturally, this has received attention origination from the 
highest levels. "President Clinton and I are committed to promoting the growth of electronic 
commerce and robust, secure communications worldwide while protecting the public safety and 
national security," Vice President Gore said in a statement regarding encryption on October 1, 
1996. However, Alex Lash, in a recent ClNet article, writes that "the Clinton White House wants 
access to encrypted messages everywhere ... according to a March 12 draft of the 'Electronic 
Data Security Act of 1997' obtained by ... [the] Center for Democracy and Technology ... the 
administration wants to find a sponsor for a bill that would give law enforcement agencies the 
ability to intercept and [sic] encrypted communication and stored data." 
What does this mean for on-line privacy? As Esther Dyson was quoted as saying in the 
transcript of "Third Panel Discussion Questions and Answers" from the White House Forum on 
the Role of Science and Technology in Promoting National Security and Global Stability, " .. .if 
the government can watch everything that goes on and the government is good, that is a very 
good situation. If the government can watch everything that goes on and the government is bad, 
that is a very bad situation." Consider, as an example, an investigation into a high-ranking 
government official at the behest of the general public. If the investigators trade any information 
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electronically, there would be a risk that the security of that information might be compromised, 
resulting in a perversion of due process and justice. It would also mean that those individuals 
working for government agencies could potentially have access to medical and financial records 
of any person who transmits any electronic reports regarding those matters. Again, it could 
result in an invasion of privacy through public disclosure of private facts. Ethically, though, 
does not the American government have the responsibility of safeguarding its citizens from 
criminal activity? Undoubtedly, the answer is yes, the government is responsible for the well-
being of the public. However, this could be done even more effectively if the government did 
not require warrants to search homes. Should it be given the right to search the contents of e-
mail without any similar document? In his article, Lash reports that "[according to] Jonah 
Seiger, a policy analyst at the [Center for Democracy and Technology] ... 'Email 
communications are a much richer view of what you do and who you are, more analogous to 
your living room than to your phone. We don't allow secret searches of people's living rooms." 
In WashingtonPost.com article by Pacheco and Whitney regarding encryption, FBI 
director Louis Freech is quoted as saying, " ... we are simply looking to continue ... electronic 
surveillance under very stringent conditions. If we foreclosed from those areas ... the safety of 
this country will be impaired." Undoubtedly, he is correct. Also in that same article is a quote 
from Senator Conrad Bums which reads, " ... denying millions of law-abiding people the use of 
... a security product for 'law enforcement' reasons is like banning deadbolt locks because they 
make it a little harder to kick down the doors of a few drug dealers." Undoubtedly, Senator 
Bums is also correct. Therefore, an acceptable solution to all concerned parties must lie between 
these two positions. Currently, "the Clinton administration has espoused a policy that gives law 
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- enforcement, with a court order, easy access to all encryption keys. The Commerce Department 
is also authorized to limit the strength of encryption that can be exported from the United States . 
. . [and] the Department of Justice has the right to review any export license application" 
(Pacheco and Whitney). This means that ultimately, the government will have access to all 
public keys should it want them, a position which is highly unacceptable to privacy advocates. 
Instead, perhaps the government should look towards a policy similar to the one which they now 
have, only without giving the government the ability to directly intercept any encrypted 
communication. What might be more acceptable to all concerned parties would be a program by 
which any manufacturer or exporter of encryption software would have to receive a license 
before dealing with the product. Standards for receiving a license would be agreed upon not only 
by the government but also by representatives from the industry to ensure that the criteria were 
not so stringent as to make it impossible to obtain the necessary certification. Finally, any end-
users who desire to use the product should be made to obtain a license or a permit and be 
registered as a user of encryption software. Some restrictions on end-users which would prevent 
them from being able to obtain encryption software would be prior criminal convictions, for 
example. In this way, encryption software would be marginally controlled, but still accessible to 
those with legitimate needs. 
IV. What Should Be Done? 
Determining what is to be done about these privacy issues and the ethics surrounding 
them has become a hotly debated topic in Washington, D.C .. One notable event recently caught 
the attention of U.S. lawmakers: " ... the Social Security Administration's Web site [had a] 
feature that allowed surfers to look up their salary information, records of taxes paid into Social 
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- Security or Medicare, and eligibility for benefits" (Macavinta). This spawned a rush of 
-
-
legislation designed to prevent any further breaches of privacy. Macavinta notes that soon after, 
the Personal Information Privacy Act, the Federal Internet Privacy Protection Act, the Social 
Security Information Safeguards Act, and the Social Security Online Privacy Protection Act were 
all introduced or reintroduced for consideration to Congress. The Social Security Information 
Safeguards Act and the Social Security Online Privacy Protection Act are both designed in order 
to prevent the disclosure by ISPs of clients' Social Security Numbers to third parties. The 
Personal Information Privacy Act also seeks to keep Social Security Numbers from being 
disclosed on the World Wide Web, but in addition attempts to prevent the use of "unlisted 
telephone numbers and other personal information" (Macavinta). The Federal Internet Privacy 
Protection Act is different in that is "would prohibit federal agencies from making available 
online individual's records on education, financial transactions, medical history, or employment 
history that contain the name, an identifying number, or symbol assigned to individuals" 
(Macavinta). In the article, Senator Dianne Feinstein of California was quoted as saying, "our 
private lives are becoming commodities with tremendous values in the marketplace." This is 
especially true when considered in the light of the cookie debate. Further, this leads to a highly 
probable invasion of privacy by appropriation (taking the name or likeness of another for the 
benefit of the appropriating party). 
Consider the following example. In a virtual world, invasion of privacy by appropriation 
could be performed by simply accessing that feature of the Social Security web site which 
allowed users to obtain such information about other individuals (it is important to note that this 
feature of the web site was quickly disabled). With the Social Security Number of another 
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individual, it would be possible to obtain very important personal information, such as bank 
records. With these bank records, it is conceivable that credit card numbers would be a phone 
call away. This would clearly be a case of violation of privacy .. 
Ethically, though, whose responsibility is it to serve as watchdog for on-line privacy? 
Some seem to believe that it should be the federal government in domestic matters. Coursey 
states: 
"online services need to rewrite their terms of service to make it clear that users have no 
expectation of privacy if a law-enforcement authority shows up with a warrant. Privacy 
should also be waived if it's necessary to investigate serious infractions of other parts of 
the service agreement - such as unsolicited pornography, password hackers, stalkers and 
threats. But the services should be prohibited from reading users' E-mail without proper 
cause." 
This, of course, is one possible answer to the question of on-line privacy. However, he 
leaves unanswered the even more important question - what is proper cause to read users' 
e-mail? Naturally, if standards which are applicable for interception and reading of postal mail 
were applied to e-mail.this would provide a set standard which would likely be acceptable to the 
vast majority of users. However, he says that privacy should be waived if there is an 
investigation of a severe infraction of the agreement the user entered into with his or her ISP 
upon signing on for the service. This seems to indicate that the ISP would be responsible for the 
investigation. If this is true, then it would stand to reason that they would set the standards for 
what constitutes "a serious infraction." This may lead to the possibility that e-mail could be 
intercepted and read in the name of "investigating a serious infraction." Moreover, the end user 
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would likely never know that the e-mail was read by someone other than the sender and him or 
herself. It would likely be acceptable to a majority of people to let only the local or federal 
authorities investigate such matters, and as shall be discussed next, the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act seems to stand in disagreement with Coursey. If small businesses 
are able to have access to personal communication, this could lead to a public disclosure of 
private facts if employees who routinely read users' e-mail divulge their contents. Having the 
authority to intercept and read electronic communications in the hand of people who are trained 
and trusted to perform such investigations would seem more likely to protect the average 
person's privacy. 
V. Safeguards In Place Today 
Another perhaps more sensible step taken to protect on-line privacy was first formulated 
in 1968 by Congress. According to Cavazos and Morin, the lawmakers were concerned that 
"newly developed means of electronic eavesdropping posed a serious threat to privacy rights" 
(16). The result was the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), and it was revised in 
1986 to account for newer forms of communication (16). Under the ECPA, it is illegal to attempt 
to or successfully intercept electronic communication in any form, as well as to "intentionally 
use or disclose the contents of any electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know 
that the information was obtained through the interception of an electronic communication in 
violation of the ECPA" (Cavazos and Morin 17). 
Obviously, the key term to understand is "intercept." According to the ECPA, 
interception is "the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral 
communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device" (qtd. in Cavazos 
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and Morin 18). However, the authors note that this definition is under constant revision and 
should not be said to be absolutely finalized. The Act also goes on to describe the roles of those 
in charge of the ISPs, the system operators (or simply, "sysops"). It carefully outlines the only 
conditions in which they may divulge the contents of any communication sent to them or those 
they employ. The first is if the sysop is authorized to take such action under the ECPA. The 
second situation in which the sysop would be legally able to reveal the contents the message is if 
the sysop has the permission of the sender or any recipient of the communication. The third 
provision arises if it is necessary for the sysop to open or divulge the contents ofthe message in 
order to properly send the message (presumably to prevent the message being lost because of a 
technical problem). Finally, the sysop may divulge the contents of a message if it was 
accidentally sent to him or her and the contents deal with impending criminal activity (Cavazos 
and Morin 18). 
In the case of e-mail or other electronic messages not sent directly to the sysop or those 
working for them, the following are exceptions where either interception or disclosure (or both) 
are not considered to be violations of the ECP A. Cavazos and Morin summarize the most 
important of these exceptions as being situations where: 
• the interception or disclosure were done while performing tasks necessary to the rendition 
of service to customers; 
• when providing assistance to those legally able to intercept electronic communications; 
• one is legally authorized to intercept an electronic communication and has the consent of 
any party involved in the communication or is a party involved with the communication; 
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• one is not legally authorized to intercept an electronic communication and is or has the 
consent of any party involved in the communication unless the interception is performed 
with the intent committing a crime in doing so; 
• the electronic communication is considered to be in a public forum; 
• the communication was intercepted to verify that such a communication was sent (18, 
19). 
Now, consider the following summary of an actual story reported by USA Today on 
March 13, 1997. Sharon Lopatka of Maryland, age 35, was a married woman who created and 
maintained World Wide Web pages out of her home. She met Robert Glass over the Internet. 
Glass proceeded to send Lopatka e-mail detailing "in detail how he was going to sexually 
torture ... and eventually kill her," according to police documents quoted in the USA Today 
article. Lopatka agreed to meet Glass. Eventually, Lopatka's husband reported to the authorities 
that his wife was missing; however, his wife left him a note, a portion of which read, " ... ifmy 
body is never retrieved, don't worry, know that I'm at peace." Further, the article says that the 
note specifically requested that Lopatka's husband not pursue her assailant in any way. It is 
unknown as to why she agreed to meet with Glass. 
Suppose now that either Glass's or Lopatka's sysop had for some reason intercepted the 
message detailing the planned murder. Suppose further that the sysop in question was not acting 
in any manner by which he would be excused by the ECP A. In this instance, the sysop would be 
found to be guilty of the crime of intercepting an electronic communication? Ifhe chose to 
notify the authorities, however, would he be charged for divulging the contents of that 
communication? This is one area which the ECPA does not seem to address. Is the sysop 
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- ethically bound to notify the proper authorities and risk being punished for the illegal 
interception, or should he or she say nothing since legally, they should not even know of the 
contents of the message? Naturally, this quandary is not one which will occur with great 
frequency; what is important is how this issue would be addressed. 
-
VI. Conclusion 
As in many issues, moderation is called for when dealing with the regulation of privacy 
rights on the Internet. As Feinberg sarcastically wrote, "only those who have done or wish to do 
something shameful demand privacy" (343). This is, of course, not the case. As has been 
demonstrated in this thesis, absolute privacy could be as damaging as absolute disclosure. 
Therefore, the answer which causes the least damage must lie somewhere between these two 
points of view. Anonymous e-mail can be a dangerous thing; simply ask anyone of the persons 
who has an image of themselves being raped in the newsgroup 
"alt.binaries.pictures.erotica.rape," and you will discover just how damaging anonymity can be. 
However, ask any number of people who use it for legitimate purposes how useful it can be, as 
well. As long as those investigating crimes committed by people using anonymous e-mail have 
access to anonymous services as well, no one is guaranteed to be able to perform an on-line 
crime without worry of being caught. 
This simply goes to show that there can be no one blanket policy to cover all privacy 
issues on the Internet. There must be at least as many safeguards as there are ways of violating 
privacy in order to protect the users around the world. Frequently, issues which pit competing 
interests against one another often lead to policies which are solutions for specific situations. 
Gunther notes that there can actually be two senses of the term "privacy." The first is "a 'right to 
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- selective disclosure,' or interest in the control of information ... and [secondly] a private 
-
'autonomy' of choice about performing acts or undergoing experiences" (504). Interestingly, 
this discussion of privacy in the on-line world has touched on both senses of the term as noted by 
Gunther. Cookies, of course, refer to the first term, while the right to use cryptography might be 
a case of one choosing to perform an act and wishing to do so without government interference. 
Discussing the decision regarding Roe v. Wade, Gunther notes that the government may only 
interfere in with the woman's decision to have an abortion when the state's interests are 
"sufficiently 'compell[ed]'" (514). This case may be applied to the Internet; perhaps it should 
only be the case that privacy may be invaded when the state has a compelling reason to do so -
for example, if encryption software is being utilized to transmit to individuals who seek to 
violate national security. There could never be only one situation or one blanket statement of 
what events would compel the state to invade the privacy of an individual. Again, there must be 
solutions to which are specific to the individual problems which arise. 
It should be duly noted that anyone looking for a perfect solution in an imperfect world is 
simply engaging in a waste of their time; instead, efforts should be made to find the happy 
mediums proposed by this thesis. However, who is responsible for seeking out this medium? Is 
the manufacturers of Internet access software? Is it the ISP? Or perhaps the governments? 
While all of these must have a hand in finding that medium, more than ever the responsibility 
rests in the hands ofthe individual for the time being. However, the problem with governments 
regulating what is legal and what is not is made more difficult by the nature of the Internet itself. 
Since it spans the entire globe, it also spans almost every nation's borders, as well. What is legal 
in one country may not be legal in another. For example, in country Xthe standards for 
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- obscenity are such that if a man or woman exposes their knees in public, they are committing a 
-
crime. How can this county's laws be satisfied when the Internet provides access for 
uncountable instances of just this infraction of their legal code? Obviously, human nature would 
seem to dictate that for anything on the Internet, there is the possibility that someone in the world 
will be offended by it. It is not unlike the case of the adult bookstore in a neighborhood; the 
locals may object to its presence, but they do not have to visit it. Is this a satisfactory answer to 
their problem? Most likely, the answer is no - this bookstore may attract a number of insidious 
individuals who are unwanted in the neighborhood. Is the same true of the Internet? Will the 
availability of offensive materials cause an increase in criminal activity? Possibly - but in the 
case of the Internet, the availability of information and the ability to communicate inexpensively 
with people around the globe is more likely to cause more good overall than it will cause harm. 
Eventually, perhaps, the Internet could be regulated by a council of representatives around the 
world who speak for their individual governments so that standards can be set which are 
agreeable to the majority of individuals. Until such time as this is a feasible solution, which 
hopefully is not a time far off, one should take the time to educate him or herself about the 
possible invasions of their privacy which can occur and take steps to avoid them. For now, 
common sense and careful reasoning are the best answers to problems concerning on-line 
privacy. 
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